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[Crim. No. 7741. In Bank. July 14,1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAMUEL R. 
QUINN, JR., Defendant and Appellant. 
[Ia,1b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confession8-Voluntariness.-
Defendant's admissions to a probation officer after he had 
pleaded guilty to one of the offenses charged against him were 
involuntary and thus inadmissible against defendant at a 
trial of the charges after he had been allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea and to plead not guilty, where the probation officer, 
who was to make a report and recommendation to the trial 
judge before sentencing following the guilty plea, advised de-
fendant to tell the truth and told him that he would not recom-
mend probation if defendant failed to tell the truth. 
[2] ld.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-A confession or 
admission induced by promises of leniency or by threats is 
involuntary and therefore inadmissible. 
[3] ld.-Evidence-Admissions-Plea of Guilty Subsequently 
Withdrawn.-Where defendant pleaded guilty to one of the 
charges against him but subsequently was allowed to withdraw 
such plea and enter a not guilty plea to all the offenses 
charged, evidence of the withdrawn guilty plea was inadmis-
sible at defendant's subsequent trial. (Disapproving People v. 
Clay,208 Cal.App.2d 773, 777-779 [25 Cal.Rptr. 464]; People v. 
Ivy, 163 Cal.App.2d 436, 438-440 [329 P.2d 505]; People v. 
Snell, 96 Cal.App. 657, 662-663 [274 P. 560]; see People v. 
Russell, 77 Cal.App. 113, 120 [246 P. 110] holding such a plea 
admissible. ) 
[4a,4b] ld.-Double Punishment.-In a prosecution for robbery, 
theft of an automobile and unlawful possession of narcotics, it 
was error to sentence defendant to concurrent sentences for 
robbery and possession of narcotics where such offenses were 
part of an indivisible criminal transaction. 
[5] Id.-Double Punishment.-Concurrent sentences are double 
punishment within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 423; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ (82). 
[3] Propriety and prejudicial effect of showing, in criminal 
ease, withdrllwn guilty plea, note, 86 A.L.R.2d 326. See also Am. 
Jur., Evidence (1st ed § 6(7). 
McX:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 467(7); (2] Crim-
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double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than 
one crime. 
[6] Id.-Double Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double 
punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one 
crime, applies not only when there is one act in the ordinary 
sense, but also when there is a course of conduct that con-
stitutes an indivisible transaction punishable under more than 
one statute. 
Prosecution for armed robbery, theft of an automobile and 
City and County of San Francisco. Harry J. Neubarth, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for armed robbery, theft of an automobile and 
illegal possession of narcotics. Judgment of conviction re-
versed. 
Benjamin Y. Davis and George Franklyn Duke for De-
fendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., 
and Edward P. O'Brien, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding Mm guilty of 
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) , theft of an 
automobile (Veh. Code, § 10851), and unlawful possession of 
narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500). He was sentenced to 
imprisonment in the state prison with the sentences to run 
concurrently on all three convictions. 
Early in 1962, two masked men robbed the College Phar-
macy in San Francisco, taking cash and narcotics. They 
escaped in an automobile stolen the previous nillht. Defendant 
was later identified as one of the two men and was indicted 
for armed robbery, automobile theft, and possession of nar-
cotics. Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge of robbery 
was accepted, and the court dismissed the two other charges 
on motion of the Prosecution. A motion for probation was 
continued for hearing and determination. Thereafter, the 
court permitted defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
The two other charges were reinstated, and defendant pleaded 
not gui1t~r to all three. \ 
A San Francisco probation officer testified over objection 
that defendant had previously been arraigned on the same . 
) 
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three charges and had pleaded guilty to robbery. The officer 
also testified, again over objection, that immediately after the 
guilty plea, he interviewed defendant in preparing a pre-
sentence probation report and that defendant admitted that 
his motive for the robbery had been to get narcotics, that he 
J}ad used a "phony" gun, and that he had stolen the auto-
mobile used in the robbery. The probation officer testified that 
he always tells convicted defe.ndants interviewed in prepar-
ing probation reports that "if they are not telling us the 
truth, then we most certainly would not recommend pro-
bation for them. "1 
IThe probation officer testi1led: 
"Q .••• You actually never promise anybody,or promised him, or 
anybody else probation, do you' 
"A. No. 
"Q. No. But you do tell them that if they cooperate by telling you 
everything that they 'know about an incident, that it will serve them well 
later on with the Court, is that right' 
, 'A. Most eases we would, yes. I'm not certain whether I did in this 
ease. But it's not unusual for us to use terms along that line. 
". 
"Q. And so you tell them that you have to take this report and 
furnisl:. it to the Court, and if they cooperate with you and tell you 
everything that they know that it certainly is to their benefit' 
"A. Wc don't use the term 'eooperate with us' so much as we tell 
them to tell the truth, beeause it helps everybody to be honest and 
sincere in their statements. 
, 'Q. And ian't there more or leas '" an implication on your part that 
if they tell you all the factors ••• and relate everything that they do 
know, that they stand a better ehance of getting probation or better 
ehance of getting a lighter sentence' 
"A. Well, we tell them that by telling the truth they stand a better 
chance of having us recommend probation, because if they tell 1lIl state· 
ments that we find out through our investigation are not true, then we 
will not recommend probation for them. 
". . . . 
"Q. Well, in your opinion, Mr. Jenkins, would it appear that Mr. 
Quinn was giving you a statement more or leas thinking that the more he 
told you about this particular charge that the better he would be 
treated by you; in other words, that he would benefit from his state· 
menU . . 
"THE WITNESS: I thought that Mr. Quinn was just being honest 
with me. , 
, 'Q. But prior to his being honest with you, did you represent in any 
way whatsoever that he would gain ~ any respect whatsoever by being 
honest with you' 
"A. I probably did teU him that; I tell that to everybody, that by 
being honest with us they are helping tllemselves; if I can explain this 
properly, I tell them if they are Dot telling us the truth, then wc most 
.' .~-) 
) 
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[la] Defendant contends that his admissions to the pro. 
bation officer were involuntary. [2] A confession or admis. 
sion induced by promises of leniency or by threats is in. 
voluntary and therefore inadmissible. (People v. Underwood, 
ante, pp. 113, 120·121 [37 Oa1.Rptr. 313,389 P.2d 937] ; People 
v. Brommcl, 56 Ca1.2d 629, 632-634 [15 Oal.Rptr. 909,364 P.2d 
845] ; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 
354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418] ; People v. Rogers, 22 Cal.2d 
787, 805 [141 P.2d 722] ; cf. Hayncs v. Washington, 373 U.S. 
503,513 [83 S.Ct.l336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513,520.521]; Lynumn v. 
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 [83 S.Ct. 917,9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926]; 
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556,560 [74 S.Ot. 716, 98 L.Ed. 
948, 952].) [lb] The probation officer, who was to make a 
report and a recommendation to the trial judge before sen-
tencing, told defendant that he would not recommend pro-
bation if defendant failed to tell the' truth. Defendant's ad-
missions following this threat or implied promise of leniency 
were therefore involuntary, and their introduction into evi-
dence requires reversal. (People v. BrommeZ, -supra, 560a1.2d 
629, 634; People v. Trout, supra, 54 Ca1.2d 576, 585.) 
Other questions remain that may arise on a retrial. [3] De· 
fendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of his withdrawn plea of guilty. Penal Oode sections 
1192.1 through 1192.3 provide that a defendant cannot be 
punished for a higher degree of crime or by a more severe 
punishment than that specified in a plea of guilty accepted 
by the prosecution and approved by the court. Section 1192.4 
provides that if a defendant's plea of guilty is not accepted, 
he may withdraw it, and it may not be used in evidence. In 
People v. Hamilton, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 112·114 [82 Cal.Rptr. 4, 
383 P.2d 412], and People v. Wl'lson, 60 Oa1.2d 189, 155-156 
[32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452], we excluded evidence of an 
offer to plead guilty. Although offers are not expressly covered 
certainly would not recommend probation for them. I put it that 'WIQ'. 
it'. in the negative. 
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . 
"Q. You told him that if he didn't ten the truth that there would be 
no possible ehanee for probation, ian't that right! 
"A. No, I wouldn't ten him that. I ean't lay whether he will pt 
probation or not, :Mr. Davia. I don 'to-
"Q. But you have a right to make a reeommendationt 
CIA.. Oh,yell. 
II Q. To the Superior-. 
II A. I ten them if they don't tell us the truth, the probabilit,.-Iu 
taet it is almost certain we would not reconll.llend probation for them if 
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by section 1192.4, they are within its policy. Excluding 
withdrawn pleas of guilty also furthers c, the obvious pur-
pose" of section 1192.4 to encourage the settlement of crim-
inal cases. (People v. Hamilton, S1/pra, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 112.)2 
Evidence of defendant's withdrawn plea of guilty was 
tllerefore inadmissible. Earlier eases holding such a plea ad- . 
missible (People v. Clay, 208 Cal.App.2d 773, 777-779 [25 
Cal.Rptr. 464] ; People v. Ivy, 163 Cal.App.2d 436, 438-440 
[329 P.2d 505); People v. Snell, 96 Ca1.App. 657, 662-663 
[274 P. 560); see People v. Russell, 77 Cal.App. 113, 120 
[246 P. 110) are disapproved. 
[4a] The trial court also erred in sentencing defendant to 
concurrent sentences for first degree robbery and possession 
of narcotics. [5] Section 654 of the Penal Code proscribes 
double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more 
than one crime, and concurrent sentences are double punish-
ment. (People v. Kehoe, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 32] 1 ; 
People v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].) 
[6] The section applies not only when there is one 8rt in 
the ordinary sense, but when tlJere is a course of conduct tlHlt 
constitutes an indivisible transaction punishable under 1ll0l'P 
tlIan one statute. (People 'Y. McFarland, 58 Ca1.2d 748! 760 
2A majority of recent eases considering the question have held that 
withdrawn pleas of guilt,. are inadmissible. (Bee eases collected in 86 
A.L.R.2d 326.) Various reasons have been given for this rule: (1) An 
order withdrawillg a plea of guilty annuls the plea for all purposes 
(Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 [47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.E'l. 
1009, 1012]; but see State v. Thomson, 203 Ore. 1, 17 [278 P.2d 142, 
149] (concurring opinion); 4 Wigmore, Evidenee (3d ed.) § 1067 at p. 
66, n. 2); (2) admission of the plea violat('s the prh-i1ege against self-
incrimination (Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 274-275 [75 App. 
D.C. 274, 141 A.L.R. 1318, 1329-1330] (Rutledge, J.»; (3) a plea of 
guilty is not within the admission exeeption of the hearsay rule, for it is 
often based on motives other than admitting guilt (see State v. Weekly, 
41 Wn.2d 727, 731 [252 P.2d 246, 250] (dissenting opinion); d. Wood 
v. United States, sU1Jra, ]28 F.2d 265, 273 [75 App.D.C. 274, 141 A.L.R. 
1318, 1327-1328]; but see People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 172 [173 
N.E.2d 35]); (4) admitting the plea into evidence is inconsistent with 
the privilege to obtain its withdrawal (see, e.g., Kercheval v. United 
Statcs, aupra, 274 U.S. 220, 224-225 [47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012-
1013]; People v. Ryan, 82 Cal. 617, 619 [23 P. 121], disapproved in 
People v. Boyd, 67 Cal.App. 292, 303 [227 P. 783] (opinion of Supreme 
Court denyinlt hearing); People v. Spitaleri, aupra, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 172· 
] 73). TlIis last reason for excluding the plea is the most persuasive. A 
trial judge may alld sometimes must permit a plea of guilty to be 
withdrawn for" good cause showrl." (Pen. Code, § 1018.) The privilege 
to withdraw the plea is eft'ecth'ely nullified if it can be introduced 
against the defendant later. 
I 
I 
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[26 Cal.Rptr.473, 376 P.2d 449]; Neal v. State o/California, s' 
55 Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; PeopZe v.' 
Brown,49 Ca1.2d 577, 591 [320 P.2d 5].) [4b] In the pres- · .• ·1 ... :.' . ·.' .... ent case, the theft and possession of the narcotics, the theft 
of the money, and the robbery were all part of an indivisible 
criminal transaction. (People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 
748, 760; People v. Griffin, 209 Cal.App.2d 125, 129 [25 Cal. 
Rptr. 667]; People v. Nor Woods, supra, 37 Cal.2d 584, 586; 
People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 715.) Accordingly, if 
on retrial defendant is convicted of both possession of nar-
cotics and robbery, he may be sentenced only for first degree 
robbery, the more serious of the two offenses. (People v: 
McFarland, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 748, 762-763.) The theft of the 
automobile was a separate crime completed before the rob-
bery was committed j if defendant is convicted thereof on 
retrial he may also be sentenced for that theft. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J.,and 
Peek, J., concurred. 
